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[In Darfur, Sudan i]t’s the political situation that gives the Chinese 
government political and economic advantage.  A typical Western 
firm would find it difficult to operate there and Chinese firms do not 
have qualms about that. 
― Prof. Ming Wan, George Mason University1 
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ONLINE NEWSHOUR, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/china-darfur 
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INTRODUCTION 
ompanies take advantage of favorable business climates all the 
time.  That’s the nature of business.  But when a company helps 
engineer genocide in order to create that favorable business climate, it 
should be called to account.  This is precisely what the Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has done in the Darfur 
region of Sudan.  This Article calls them to account.  No company 
should be able to get away with assisting in the commission of 
genocide by hiding behind the legal construct that it is not a natural 
person. 
Genocide is the crime of crimes.2  The Holocaust is the historical 
benchmark.  It is, quite simply, the eradication of a people.  The 
horror of the Holocaust moved the world to outlaw genocide in 1948.3  
People have been convicted by a variety of tribunals for committing 
genocide and for complicity in genocide for many years.  One of the 
bedrock principles to emerge from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
after World War II was that individuals could be prosecuted for 
violations of international law.  And, although that principle was 
made clear with respect to natural persons like Nazi leaders and 
Japanese generals, the principle was less clear with respect to legal 
persons like corporations.4 
The treaty criminalizing genocide holds “persons” accountable for 
committing genocide––it does not distinguish between natural or legal 
persons.5  Indeed, nothing in the travaux preparatoires to the 
Genocide Convention accords corporations impunity in this regard.  
But impunity is what companies have historically enjoyed with 
respect to criminal wrongdoing––especially in the area of 
international law.6  While rights tend to clarify themselves quickly, it 
 
2 John Hagan, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, 20 RESEARCHING LAW: AN ABF 
UPDATE, Winter 2009, at 1, 2, available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org 
/uploads/cms/documents/abf_rl_win_09_final.pdf; Patricia M. Wald, Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 621, 629 (2007). 
3 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened 
for signature Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) 
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
4 KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 253 (2011). 
5 See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. IV. 
6 W. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liability for International Crimes Under Canada’s 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 201, 202 (2009). 
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often takes decades for unambiguous obligations to similarly emerge 
from international law’s murky depths.7 
That is not to say that corporations cannot be held civilly liable for 
wrongdoing.8  Companies have already been sued, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for doing business in Sudan where human rights 
abuses are implicated.9  In the United States, this involves litigation 
under the Alien Tort Statute, which has recently been interpreted 
rather restrictively.10  But criminal sanctions have not been 
forthcoming. 
This is true no matter whether the company is involved in war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.  To the extent 
corporations are involved in any of these “big three” types of 
prohibited jus cogens conduct, their involvement in the first two are 
typically more direct.11  And it would be safe to assume that most 
corporations would be loath to actively commit genocide because of 
the stigma associated with that crime.  So, to the extent a company 
 
7 “[T]he issue of corporate criminal liability for international law violations remains 
unresolved.”  Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 
33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 955 (2008). 
8 Jonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human 
Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 899, 905 (2008). 
9 Alien Torts: Trial Trails, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2010, at 87. 
10 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability 
for international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for 
a violation of the law of nations” and that “offenses against the law of nations . . . for 
violations of human rights can be charged against States and against individual men and 
women but not against juridical persons such as corporations”). 
11 “Private military companies engaging in direct combat are perhaps the most notorious 
for committing atrocities.”  Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing 
Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 135, 153 (2005). 
According to a former UN special rapporteur, the presence of mercenaries “is a 
factor which tends to increase the violent and cruel nature of specific aspects of 
the conflict in which they are involved.”  Adventurer mercenaries fighting in the 
postcolonial wars in Africa, for example, engaged in human rights abuses on a 
massive scale.  The French mercenary Costas Giorgiu, who led a band in the 
Angolan civil war in the 1970s, regularly fired on civilians and summarily 
executed many of his own group when he believed they might desert.  More 
recently, during the conflict in Sierra Leone, officers of Executive Outcomes, 
working under contract with the government, reportedly ordered employees 
carrying out air strikes against rebels to “[k]ill everybody,” even though the 
employees had told their superiors they could not distinguish between civilians 
and rebels.  Neither the Executive Outcomes employees, nor the company itself, 
has been held legally accountable. 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
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finds itself involved in genocide, that involvement will usually be 
passive,12 typically discovered after the fact, and quietly allowed to 
continue if the investment already made is large enough to induce 
continued support.13 
As international trade expanded during the Cold War and beyond, 
the extensive rights accorded multinational corporations were not 
checked with coextensive obligations.14  And even though 
international criminal law began to develop and congeal around 
individual and state responsibility, the idea of corporate responsibility 
slipped through the net.15 
Throughout the past half century, states and international 
organizations have continued to expand the codification of 
international human rights law protecting the rights of individuals 
against governmental violations.  Parallel with increasing attention to 
the development of international criminal law as a response to war 
crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity, attention to 
individual responsibility for grave human rights abuses has grown.  
“The creators of this ever-larger web of human rights obligations, 
however, failed to pay sufficient attention to some of the most 
powerful nonstate actors in the world, that is, transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises.”16 
This state of affairs suits companies’ interests.17  But corporate 
entities increasingly find themselves enmeshed in atrocities that 
demand judicial redress and greater public scrutiny.  And no crime 
justifies more scrutiny than genocide. 
Nevertheless, defenders of corporate impunity would argue that 
prosecuting corporations for genocide is bad policy, often resting such 
 
12 Michael J. Kelly, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide Under International Law, 
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming Summer 2012). 
13 Wim Huisman & Elies van Sliedregt, Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, 
International Crimes and Corporate Complicity, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 803, 818 (July 
2010). 
14 Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, Regulating Corporations under 
International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again, 8 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 725, 737 (July 2010). 
15 DESISLAVA STOITCHKOVA, TOWARDS CORPORATE LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 95 (2010). 
16 David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Current Developments: Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003). 
17 See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29 (4th ed. 
2008).  “It almost seems as though a certain level of corporate crime is just assumed as a 
real-life ‘cost of doing business.’”  Id. 
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arguments on economic grounds.  But defenders would also make an 
array of procedural and jurisdictional arguments against corporate 
criminal liability for genocide under international law: 
1. Corporations are not subjects of international law generally; 
2. Corporations are not subject to the Genocide Convention in 
particular; 
3. Corporations do not commit crimes, people do; 
4. Even if corporations can commit crimes, no theory of 
vicarious criminal liability applies to corporations under 
international law: 
 a. Command responsibility is used only in the military 
context; 
 b. Respondeat superior is recognized only domestically; 
 c. Joint criminal enterprise is not used against corporations; 
5. Genocide requires specific intent––which corporations cannot 
form, and, in any case, proving complicity does not relieve 
prosecutors of this mens rea standard; 
6. No international criminal tribunal has jurisdiction to try a 
corporation for genocide. 
I analyze and rebut these arguments in the second portion of this 
paper, which appears in vol. 6:2 of the Harvard Law & Policy Review 
(forthcoming 2012).18  By agreement, and to their credit, the editors 
of the Oregon Law Review elected to run this case study earlier in 
order to bring attention to the grave situation in Darfur and register 
the importance of corporate liability for genocide as the International 
Criminal Court continues its work on the Sudan situation.19 
This case study explores the involvement of China’s National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the Sudan tragedy, or “as New 
York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof and others have put it, that 
‘Beijing is financing, diplomatically protecting and supplying the 
arms for the first genocide of the 21st century’ in Darfur.”20 
 
18 See Kelly, supra note 12. 
19 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens 
Investigation in Darfur (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc 
/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/the%20prosecutor%20of%20the 
%20icc%20opens%20 investigation%20in%20darfur?lan=en-GB. 
20 Gary J. Bass, Human Rights Last, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr. 2011, at 81. 
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I 
CHINA’S STATE OIL COMPANY AND THE SUDANESE GENOCIDE 
Any discussion of evolving legal theories requires a fact pattern.  
The situation in the Sudan is but one example of how corporate 
complicity in genocide21 has driven hundreds of thousands to their 
deaths and millions into exile.  Scholars and politicians may quarrel 
about whether particular atrocities qualify as genocide.  That was 
certainly the case with respect to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by 
Serbian forces,22 and it is true with respect to the situation in Darfur. 
That determination is not inconsequential, as the label “genocide,” 
affixed to a certain atrocity, carries with it the legal obligation 
undertaken by contracting parties in the 1948 Genocide Convention to 
prevent genocide.23  In the context of corporate involvement in 
genocide, that means the state in which the company is chartered 
would have an international legal obligation to prohibit that company 
from doing business in the afflicted country once the atrocity in 
question qualifies as genocide. 
This, of course, has never happened.  And it is certainly one reason 
that China is eager to avoid having the Darfur catastrophe officially 
declared genocide.  As a party to the Genocide Convention, that puts 
China in a very difficult political and legal position.  In other words, 
as members of the Chinese Foreign Ministry have observed with 
respect to categorizing Darfur as the site of genocide, “We have some 
doubts.”24 
In his June 2010 report to the U.N. Security Council, the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-
 
21 The question of whether the atrocities committed in the Sudan rise to the level of 
genocide or are war crimes and crimes against humanity is at once a political and legal 
question.  The United States and many states consider the ongoing violence against the 
black population by the Arab-led government in Khartoum to be genocide.  However, a 
high-level commission of inquiry dispatched by the United Nations determined that it was 
not technically genocide because there was no proof of intent to exterminate the 
population.  The International Criminal Court has reconsidered this question and issued an 
arrest warrant for the President of Sudan on charges of genocide.  See Appendix.  For 
purposes of this discussion, and in the legal opinion of this author, the situation in the 
Sudan is genocide.  For more on this debate, see JOHN HAGAN & WENONA RYMOND-
RICHMOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (2009). 
22 MICHAEL J. KELLY, NOWHERE TO HIDE: DEFEAT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
DEFENSE FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE AND THE TRIALS OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND 
SADDAM HUSSEIN 98 (2005). 
23 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. I. 
24 Bass, supra note 20, at 84. 
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Ocampo, reiterated the level of continuing and unabated violence 
perpetrated by the Sudanese government against its own people: 
Sadly, the crime of extermination against millions displaced into 
camps continues.  Acts aimed at inflicting inhumane conditions of 
life continue.  Under-Secretary General Holmes reported to this 
Council last week the difficulties to access many areas, the 
problems of finding interlocutors in Khartoum to address those 
issues.  Those are not technical issues resulting from 
disorganization. The decision to expel humanitarian organizations, 
and the accumulation of obstacles is a policy of identified Sudanese 
officials with the aim of committing the crime of “extermination.25 
Mr. Ocampo then asked the court to issue an arrest warrant for 
Sudanese President al-Bashir on charges of genocide––which it did.26 
The Sudanese government undertook a radical policy of land 
clearing in 2003 in order to divvy up the southern and western regions 
for oil development.  The racially black residents of the southern and 
western regions resisted the encroachments of the Arab-led and 
Muslim-dominated national government located in the north.27  The 
residents began to organize rebel groups to fight back against the 
government.  That’s when things turned to genocide.  The 
government organized and armed militias called janjaweed that, with 
military support, eradicated vast swaths of black villages in the Darfur 
region––massacring countless civilians and driving survivors into 
refugee camps in neighboring Chad.28 
The figures below starkly demonstrate why the genocide was 
carried out––money.  This initial motive, once a company is invested, 
can migrate to allow the commission of crimes like genocide and, 
over time, more emphasis can come to be placed on mitigating losses 
rather than pushing for more gains: 
While commercial and financial interests seem to be the main 
motive [for corporate involvement in international crime], financial 
interests can take different forms.  In most cases, rather than profit 
maximization, loss minimization seems to be the dominant motive.  
Especially in the capital intensive extraction of natural resources, 
 
25 Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, the 
Sudan, Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, at 
¶ 35 (June 11, 2010) (Luis Moreno-Ocampo), available at http://www.iccnow.org 
/documents/Speech _UNSC_11062011.pdf. 
26 See infra Appendix. 
27 INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 153: CHINA’S THIRST FOR OIL 23 (2008), 
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/153_china_s 
_thirst_for_oil.pdf. 
28 Id. at 25–26. 
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such as oil and gold, the risk of loss of investments that were 
already made appears to be the most important reason for 
corporations to stay in a certain country or area and as a result 
become involved in international crimes.29 
The award of petroleum exploration and development blocks by 
the Sudanese government to Chinese companies demonstrates such a 
linkage.  Figure 1 depicts Sudan’s oil concessions in seventeen 
blocks.  Blocks C, 6, 17, 12A, and 12B are in the Darfur region.  
Block 6 is the only block in serious production,30 and the CNPC, 
controls ninety-five percent of that concession.  CNPC is also angling 
for the as-yet-to-be-awarded block 12A––which encompasses the 
entirety of the rest of the Darfur region.31 
 
29 Huisman & van Sliedregt, supra note 13, at 818. 
30 See Maram Mazen, Sudan Plans to Start Pumping Oil in Darfur, Petroleum Minister 
Deng Says, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-01 
/sudan-plans-to-start-pumping-oil-in-darfur-petroleum-minister-deng-says.html. 
31 See id. 
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[I]n August 2008 Darfuri rebel groups accused the government of 
mounting a military offensive in the north of block 12A.  At the 
time, a Sudan Liberation Army commander (from the Abdel Wahid 
faction) alleged that Chinese oil workers had arrived in the area and 
a spokesperson for the Sudan Liberation Army (Unity faction) 
alleged that the government was trying to clear the rebels out of the 
area in order to make way for oil exploration.33 
CNPC, lurking in the background of all this, is, in fact, one of the 
key corporate players in the atrocities that have unfolded in the Sudan 
and that continue.  In 1997, CNPC acquired a forty-percent share of 
the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), “a 
consortium that presently dominates oil production in Sudan.”34  
China, operating through CNPC’s stake in GNPOC, has 
transformed Sudan from a nation dependent on foreign energy 
supplies into an oil exporter.  These developments . . . coincided 
with Sudanese military attacks on unarmed civilians to clear a 100-
kilometer cordon sanitaire around Sudanese oil fields.  CNPC and 
GNPOC . . . contract[] with Khartoum to secure their oil operations 
and allow[] Sudanese military forces to use the companies’ air 
strips, landing pads, and mechanical support.35 
But to understand that complicity, one must understand that the 
Chinese government and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are 
working in tandem with CNPC to drive this process.  The government 
in Beijing provides political cover to the Sudanese government on 
multiple fronts––often simultaneously.36  China trains Sudanese 
 
33 Global Witness Uncovers Evidence of Oil Exploration in Darfur, EUR. COALITION 
ON OIL SUDAN (June 3, 2010), http://www.ecosonline.org/news/2010/evidence_of_oil 
_exploration _in_Darfur. 
34 Russell P. McAleavey, Note, Pressuring Sudan: The Prospect of an Oil-for-Food 
Program for Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1058, 1061 (2008). 
35 Id. at 1061–62 (internal footnotes omitted). 
36 For instance, after the International Criminal Court indicted the President of Sudan, 
China’s envoy to Sudan flew to Western capitals seeking amelioration of the charges.  He 
then returned to Sudan: 
 “I am here for consultations with the government of Sudan and to give them 
our advice and to make a few concrete suggestions,” said China’s special envoy, 
Liu Guijin, fresh from talks in London, Paris and Washington. 
 “I used those opportunities . . . to have consultations with our partners there in 
the West as to how could we work together to seek a kind of soft landing of the 
charge,” he said. 
China Wants Sudan War Crimes Crisis ‘Soft Landing’: Envoy, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 
(Oct. 26, 2008), http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hF1LKZ0GA6bDmiMIF9C0u 
WEZIfJA. 
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military pilots, who then strafe villages to clear land. 37  China is also 
the main supplier of weapons used in the genocide.38  The New York 
Times reported in 2009 that 
88 percent of Sudan’s imported small arms come from China—and 
those Chinese sales of small arms increased 137-fold between 2001 
and 2006.  China has also sold military aircraft to Sudan, and the 
BBC reported this week that two Chinese-made A-5 Fantan fighter 
aircraft were spotted on a Darfur runway last month.  The BBC also 
said that China is training Sudanese military pilots in Sudan. 
 Likewise . . . Chinese engineers supervise arms production at the 
Giad industrial complex outside Khartoum.  Chinese military 
companies have also helped set up arms factories outside Khartoum 
at Kalakla, Chojeri and Bageer.39 
Thus, an iron triangle of Chinese components is inextricably 
involved in the Sudanese genocide: the international political power 
of the government in Beijing welded together with the economic 
power of CNPC and the military power of the PLA.  This triangle 
creates a vortex the genocidal government in Khartoum cannot resist.  
Shunned by the Western world and indicted by the International 
Criminal Court, Sudan seeks political protection from the Chinese 
government––which often shields them with the threat of China’s 
veto at the U.N. Security Council and successfully waters down 
relevant resolution and sanctions language.40  Sudan depends on 
Chinese military expertise and training.41  And, finally, Sudan has 
economically become a client state of the Chinese. 
 
37 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., A President, a Boy and Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2009, at A31. 
38 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Prosecuting Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/opinion/17kristof.html?scp=15&sq=Kristof&st=nyt.  
Embarrassingly for China, as a U.N. Security Council member, it is in blatant violation of 
a U.N. arms embargo on Sudan.  See Eric Reeves, Arming Khartoum: China’s Complicity 
in the Darfur Genocide, SUDAN TRIB., Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com 
/Arming-Khartoum-China-s-complicity,36644. 
39 Kristof, supra note 38; accord HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY: 
CHINA’S MONEY, ARMS, AND POLITICS IN SUDAN 11–16 (2008), http://www.humanrights 
first.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf. 
40 See Editorial, The Power of Protest, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 15, 2008, at 34. 
Turning a blind eye to ethnic cleansing would be one thing.  But China goes 
further, and uses its influence in the United Nations Security Council to protect 
its Sudanese client.  China has helped to water down resolution 1769, which calls 
for the deployment of a joint United Nations and African Union peacekeeping 
force to protect the inhabitants of Darfur. 
Id. 
41 See Letter to the Editor, Call on China to Influence Sudan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 
2007, at A30 (stating that China offers significant “military aid to Sudan”); Kenneth Roth, 
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As the chief Chinese economic actor in the Sudan, CNPC is 
perhaps in more of a position to influence Khartoum than the other 
two components of the iron triangle.  “As a result of its efforts to 
develop Sudan’s oil industry, CNPC has become Sudan’s largest 
foreign investor, with approximately US$5 billion invested in oil field 
development and US$7-8 billion in total assets in Sudan.”42 
In fact, many foreign policy experts contend that economic power 
has outstripped political and military power in the last decade overall.  
Leslie Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
recently acknowledged this transition: 
 Now, what has changed is the composition of power in 
international affairs.  For almost all of history, international power 
was achieved in the form of military power and military force. . . . 
[P]articularly in the last fifty years or so, it has become more and 
more economic.  So power consists of economic power, military 
power, and diplomatic power, but the emphasis has shifted from 
military power . . . to now, more economic power.43 
Figure 2 illustrates the rise in oil production that Sudan 
experienced, even as Sudanese consumption remained largely static, 
during the genocide.  Figure 3 explains where the oil is going.  It goes 
in large part to China, though Japan consumes just over one quarter.  
And, while Indonesia and India are growth economies seeking new 
sources of petroleum, China takes the lion’s share (over half) of 
Sudanese oil. 
 
Op-Ed., China’s Silence Boosts Tyrants, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 20, 2006, at 7 (stating 
that China’s investment in oil from Sudan helped purchase weapons and finance the 
military in Darfur). 
42 McAleavey, supra note 34, at 1062 (citations omitted). 
43 Fashioning a Realistic Strategy for the Twenty-First Century: A Conversation with 
Leslie H. Gelb, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2010, at 5, 5. 
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Fig. 2.  Oil Production During the Darfur Genocide.44 
 
Fig. 3.  Sudan’s Oil Exports by Destination (2008).45 
So if China is an essential culprit driving the genocide in Darfur, 
how can it be made accountable for those actions?  It cannot.46  China 
 
44 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUDAN ENERGY DATA, STATISTICS 
AND ANALYSIS—OIL, GAS, ELECTRICITY, COAL (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe 
.gov/cabs/Sudan/Full.html. 
45 Id. 
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is a sovereign state––and a veto-wielding member of the U.N. 
Security Council.  It enjoys immunity from prosecution.  This holds 
true for the PLA as a component of the government.  The only way to 
pierce the PLA’s veil would be to find it a criminal organization as 
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg did with 
respect to the SS or the Gestapo.47 
Which leaves CNPC.  And, although CNPC is a corporation, the 
prospects for prosecuting it would be dim.  CNPC is a state-owned 
company, which raises questions of sovereign immunity.  It spun off 
most of its liabilities to a subsidiary, PetroChina, but Beijing controls 
over eighty-six percent of its shares.48  As such, it can make a 
colorable argument for sovereign immunity––although that would not 
likely stand in jurisdictions that recognize the market-participant 
exception to immunity.  Alternatively, CNPC can negotiate variable 
degrees of immunity from prosecution in the relevant states where it 
does business.  This is a common practice of large foreign 
corporations and often a condition of doing business in a developing 
country with immature, and often corrupt, justice systems. 
But when CNPC’s economic enterprise and legal impunity is set 
against personal stories of genocide survivors, the injustice becomes 
starkly apparent: 
Suad Ahmed[ is] a 25-year-old mother of two from Darfur.  She 
lives . . . in the Goz Amir refugee camp, and last month she was 
collecting firewood with her . . . little sister, Halima, when a band of 
janjaweed ambushed them. 
 The janjaweed regularly attack women and girls—part of a 
Sudanese policy of rape to terrorize and drive away black African 
tribes—and Ms. Suad knew how brutal the attacks are.  A 12-year-
old neighbor girl had been kidnapped by the janjaweed and gang-
raped for a week; the girl’s legs were pulled so far apart that she is 
now crippled. 
 But Ms. Suad’s thoughts were only for her sister, who is just 10.  
“You are a virgin, and you must escape,” she told her.  “Run!  I’ll 
let myself be captured, but you must run and escape.” 
 The local culture is such that if the little girl were raped, she 
might never be able to marry.  So Ms. Suad made herself a decoy 
 
46 See Moira Herbst, Oil for China, Guns for Darfur, BLOOMBERG BUS.WEEK, Mar. 
14, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/gb20080314_430126 
.htm. 
47 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 76–77 (2002). 
48 PETROCHINA CO. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2009), available at http://www 
.petrochina.com.cn/Resource/pdf/xwygg/2009ANNUALREPORT(e).pdf. 
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and allowed herself to be caught, while her sister escaped back to 
the camp. 
 Ms. Suad . . . was five months pregnant. . . . 
 . . . [T]he janjaweed beat Ms. Suad, and seven of them gang-
raped her despite her pregnancy.  “You black people have no land,” 
she recalls them telling her.  “This land is not for you.” 
 People from the camp found Ms. Suad in the hills that evening, 
too injured to walk, and carried her back.  Ms. Suad said she didn’t 
seek medical treatment, because she wanted to keep the rape as 
much of a secret as possible and didn’t even tell her husband, 
although he eventually found out along with a few others.  He 
accepted that it was not her fault.49 
Does Suad Ahmed not deserve justice because she is a poor black 
African woman?  She is Sudanese, run off her land by government-
backed forces so the land can be exploited.  Such refugees are kept 
from returning by marauding militias who murder and terrorize them.  
If this is done so the genocidal government in Khartoum can make 
millions from oil concessions, then shouldn’t the petroleum 
companies providing the economic incentives for this cruelty be held 
responsible? 
Like most corporations, CNPC shaves off assets and liabilities on a 
regular basis––the motivation for doing so is often a mystery, but 
possibly it is to avoid some responsibility or another.  As noted 
earlier, CNPC spun off most of its assets and liabilities to a subsidiary 
dubbed PetroChina in 1999.  This company was designed to attract 
foreign investment in China’s petroleum sector.  PetroChina then took 
a fifty-percent stake with CNPC in yet a new company, the CNPC 
Exploration and Development Company.50  The argument can be 
 
49 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., A Sister’s Sacrifice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/opinion/26kristof.html?scp=42&sq=Kristof&st=nyt. 
50 See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors Are 
Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1189–90 
(2010). 
PetroChina was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the China National Petroleum 
Company (CNPC), and it was created for the purpose of attracting foreign capital 
through an initial public offering (IPO) in the U.S. markets. 
 There was considerable controversy surrounding the PetroChina offering 
because CNPC held a minority joint venture position in Sudan’s Greater Nile Oil 
Project, which was accused of human rights abuses.  Various anti-slavery, 
religious, and conservative national security groups, as well as the AFL-CIO and 
several members of Congress, therefore objected to the PetroChina offering. 
 The question was whether the proceeds from PetroChina’s U.S. offering 
would be used by the parent company (CNPC) to fund operations in Sudan.  
CNPC promised to segregate the PetroChina offering funds and to create separate 
accounts for the IPO proceeds so that they would not be used for the Sudanese 
joint venture.  Critics considered this a restructuring scheme that was designed to 
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made that PetroChina is the alter ego of CNPC, sharing many of the 
same board members, officers, and even the red and gold rising sun 
logo.51  Indeed, industry research experts agree that “investors should 
treat CNPC and PetroChina as if they were a single entity.”52 
 
CNPC is involved with other national petroleum companies 
through consortium agreements in Sudan.53  Still other companies 
have been involved in the Sudanese genocide and some have even 
been taken to court in civil actions.  Most recently, the Canadian 
petroleum corporation Talisman Energy was sued in U.S. federal 
court under the Alien Tort Statute.54 
 
avoid U.S. sanctions on Sudan, and they charged that CNPC created PetroChina 
to access the U.S. capital markets while protecting itself from negative public 
reaction to its operations in Sudan. 
 There was no legal prohibition, however, on offering the PetroChina shares to 
U.S. investors.  OFAC issued an opinion that the shares could be purchased 
without violating the U.S. sanctions in place against Sudan, as long as “there was 
no ‘clear statement’ that CNPC would use the proceeds to retire Sudan-related 
debt.”  Groups objecting to the offering had to content themselves with the fact 
that CNPC’s involvement in Sudan was disclosed at all. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
51 KLD Research, Public Companies Operating in Sudan: The Relationship of 
PetroChina Company Ltd. to China National Petroleum Corporation (May 9, 2007) 
available at http://www.kld.com/newsletter/archive/press/pdf/KLD_Analysis_of _Petro 
China_Company.pdf.  Drawing the conclusion that PetroChina is, in fact, the alter ego of 
CNPC requires piercing the corporate veil and showing a commingling of funds, 
undercapitalization of the subsidiary and lack of observance of legal formalities––all of 
which are beyond the scope of this paper.  See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION 
LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 2010). 
52 Id. at 5. 
53 See Glittering Towers in a War Zone, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2006, at 27. 
54 Among Talisman Energy’s more questionable conduct was “allegedly allow[ing] the 
Sudanese government to land bombers on company-owned airstrips as part of air raids that 
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On the question of how far to pursue prosecutions against 
corporations, the chief argument will be this: where does complicity 
to genocide stop?  At some point, the line of complicity becomes 
tenuous.  And it is at this point that prosecutorial discretion kicks in 
and removes the question from the legal realm to the political and 
economic realm.  For instance, on the question of CNPC’s complicity 
in the Sudan genocide, does a prosecutor who is frustrated in bringing 
a case against CNPC then go after its key investors?  How about 
going after PetroChina––CNPC’s subsidiary and alter ego?  How 
about PetroChina’s investors?  That may be a bridge too far. 
As Nicholas Kristof, the New York Times columnist who has 
served as America’s public conscience on the Sudan, notes: 
 The biggest U.S. investor in Class H shares of PetroChina, a 
Chinese oil concern whose parent company is active in Sudan, is 
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.  I have huge respect for Mr. 
Buffett, and he may be thinking: My obligation is to make money 
for shareholders, not to use their investments in a dubious attempt to 
save the world.  But surely if Berkshire Hathaway and Fidelity 
mutual funds saw lucrative opportunities in selling bayonets to the 
janjaweed, they would balk at that.  We do have limits; the question 
is where we draw them.55 
How can one say that Berkshire Hathaway, led by Warren Buffett, 
the mild-mannered octogenarian billionaire of Omaha, Nebraska, is 
responsible for the genocide in Sudan?  A prosecutor would find the 
investment connections too tenuous.  The knowledge base of 
Berkshire Hathaway is insufficient and too difficult to prove.  But not 
so for CNPC (or possibly PetroChina), which is actually complicit in 
the genocide that clears the land for safe oil exploration in the 
concession blocks awarded to it by the Sudanese government. 
The mens rea applicable to a complicity charge is knowledge.  “It 
is sufficient that the accused had knowledge of the principal 
offender’s intention to commit a crime of the type that was in fact 
committed.”56  Large corporations would always argue that, whatever 
atrocities their employees or agents were complicit in undertaking, the 
company did not have the knowledge required to secure a criminal 
conviction.  And CNPC would certainly argue this with respect to the 
 
targeted civilians.”  Wanless, supra note 6, at 204 (citing GEORGETTE GAGNON ET AL., 
DECONSTRUCTING ENGAGEMENT 40 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca 
/documents/Mackin/DeconstructingEngagement.pdf). 
55 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Death by Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/opinion/11kristof.html?ref=nicholasdkristof. 
56 Clough, supra note 8, at 911. 
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massacres by the janjaweed militias orchestrated by the Sudanese 
government. 
But that argument is a fleeting one in the modern world of the 
multinational corporation, as Thomas Friedman deftly pointed out in 
his interview with IBM’s vice president for business consulting 
services, Laurie Tropiano: 
What Tropiano and her team at IBM do is basically X-ray your 
company and break down every component of your business and 
then put it up on a wall-size screen so you can study your corporate 
skeleton.  Every department, every function, is broken out and put 
in a box and identified as to whether it is a cost for the company or 
a source of income, or a little of both, and whether it is a unique 
core competency of the company or some vanilla function that 
anyone else could do possibly––cheaper and better. 
 “A typical company has forty to fifty components,” Tropiano 
explained . . . , as she displayed a corporate skeleton up on her 
screen, “so what we do is identify and isolate these forty to fifty 
components and then sit down and ask [the company], ‘How much 
money are you spending in each component?  Where are you best in 
class?  Where are you differentiated?  What are the totally 
nondifferentiated components of your business?  Where do you 
think you have capabilities but are not sure you are ever going to be 
great there because you’d have to put more money in than you 
want?’” 
 When you are done, said Tropiano, you basically have an X-ray 
of the company, identifying four or five “hot spots.”  One or two 
might be core competencies; others might be skills that the 
company wasn’t fully aware that it even had and that should be built 
up.  Other hot spots on the X-ray, though, might be components 
where five different departments are duplicating the same functions 
or services that others outside the company could do better and 
more cheaply and so should be outsourced . . . .”57 
Major companies today, the ones most likely to be involved in 
transnational trade that supports genocide, cannot reasonably claim 
that they don’t know what they’re doing.  Myriad internal and 
external economic and financial pressures practically mandate that all 
sectors of a corporation justify themselves along cost-benefit lines.  
And that path reveals to the company exactly what is happening as it 
conducts business. 
But at some point along the knowledge spectrum a line must be 
drawn beyond which it becomes unreasonable to presume knowing 
participation.  Without knowing what a company knows, perhaps the 
prosecutor draws the line along a set of objective criteria like scale, 
 
57 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 461–62 (2007). 
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impact, and consequence.  While it is true that Berkshire Hathaway 
was the second-largest investor in PetroChina which is, in turn, 
owned by CNPC, which is the largest investor in the Sudanese oil 
industry and the winner of concessions that are developing oil in the 
Darfur region, it cannot be said that PetroChina’s support of CNPC 
would be significantly hampered without Berkshire Hathaway’s 
support.  Indeed, Berkshire divested from PetroChina in 2007 and 
what happened?  Aside from a momentary drop in stock price, other 
investors filled the gap and PetroChina went about expanding its 
business just as its parent company, CNPC, went about expanding its 
business in the Sudan. 
So, in this scenario, while scale of investment could have impacted 
the company that was linked to the company that was complicit in the 
genocide, it did not.  There was no impact, and, one could argue, 
Berkshire was incapable of having any impact on CNPC’s Sudan 
operations via its PetroChina holdings.  Moreover, there was no 
consequence of Berkshire’s withdrawal from PetroChina.  Thus, even 
Berkshire Hathaway was impotent to affect any of CNPC’s activities. 
But, while the convergence of scale, impact, and consequence is 
perhaps where the line should be drawn for legal purposes, political, 
social, and economic pressure to encourage divestment work well––
particularly in the West.  Mr. Buffett’s shareholders confronted him at 
his company’s annual meeting in May 2007, after Berkshire 
Hathaway’s investment in PetroChina became widely known.58  
Investors insisted that Berkshire divest due to PetroChina’s link to 
CNPC and the Sudan genocide.  Subsequently, Berkshire Hathaway 
began divesting from PetroChina––completing the process in October 
2007.  Ever the businessman, Mr. Buffett regretted this action, 
observing that, in his opinion, the sell-off would not benefit the 
Sudanese people, and noting, “‘If [PetroChina stock] went down a lot, 
I’d buy it back’” and that “‘[w]e still sold it too soon.  I left a lot of 
 
58 Josh P. Hamilton, Buffett Confronts Darfur Protests at Annual Meeting, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, May 4, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid =aXTJOYueW8fA&refer=us. 
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money on the table.’”59  Berkshire Hathaway earned about $3.5 
billion on a $500 million investment.60 
Beyond the West, however, companies rely much less on the 
goodwill of shareholders or the citizens in the countries where they 
are based.  One could no more imagine Russians pestering Gazprom 
to divest from a questionable enterprise than one could imagine 
Chinese protesting the activities of CNPC or PetroChina.  The 
political, social, and economic leverage that can be effective against 
non-Western corporations is scant. 
Boiled down to an elemental statement of liability, Professor 
Andrew Clapham proposes this succinct statement: 
Where a corporation assists another entity, whether it be a state, a 
rebel group, another company, or an individual, to commit an 
international crime, the rules for determining responsibility under 
international law will be the rules developed in international 
criminal law.  The corporation will be responsible as an accomplice, 
whether or not it intended a crime to be committed, if it can be 
shown that (a) the corporation carries out acts specifically directed 
to assist, encourage, or lend moral support to the perpetration of a 
certain specific international crime and this support has substantial 
effect upon the perpetration of the crime; and (b) the corporation 
had the knowledge that its acts would assist the commission of the 
specific crime by the principal.61 
This encapsulation incorporates both the substantial-effect notion 
articulated above and the assistance notion, together with the 
knowledge test. 
Yet defenders of corporate impunity would maintain that to 
prosecute companies is, nonetheless, bad policy because it would 
result in regular harm to innocent bystanders.62  If a company closes 
as a result of criminal prosecution (or even just as the result of a 
criminal indictment like Arthur Andersen),63 regardless of the verdict, 
 
59 Stephanie Tong, Buffett Offloads All PetroChina Shares, STANDARD, Oct. 20, 2007, 
available at http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=1&art_id =55432 
&sid=15900695&con_type=1.  Fidelity also coincidentally reduced its stock holdings in 
PetroChina in May 2007.  Ross Kerber, Fidelity Denies It Sold PetroChina Stock as a 
Political Gesture, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/17 
/business/worldbusiness/17iht-fidelity.1.5752678.html. 
60 Tong, supra note 59 (alteration in original). 
61 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 265–66 
(2006). 
62 STOITCHKOVA, supra note 15, at 179–82. 
63 See Jonathan A. Bush, Essay, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in 
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 
1239 (2009); Allan Sloan, KPMG Partners Lucked Out––Thanks to Enron and Arthur 
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then the lower-level employees in the copy room or the cleaning 
offices in the basement, who had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
criminal activity, lose their jobs.  If a company’s stock plunges upon 
its indictment, then elderly pensioners who invested all their savings 
in that stock are suddenly destitute. 
Although this “might be the inevitable fallout of corporate criminal 
responsibility,”64 the fact is that such prosecutions will be rare, and 
the multinational corporations likely involved would be huge and able 
to withstand the charges.  Moreover, one cannot assume that all 
shareholders or employees are not cognizant of what the company is 
doing, nor can one “condone impunity for the sake of economic and 
social development.”65 
Finally, there is the question of economic development.  All of the 
financial and banking apparatus of the West and the international 
community encourage investment in the developing world.  How can 
a multinational corporation avoid the chilling effect of possible 
indictment when investing or doing business in a developing country?  
Won’t this possibility discourage that much-sought-after infusion of 
funds, technology, and jobs?  The answer is simple.  Don’t commit 
genocide, and you won’t be prosecuted. 
Clearly, a more definite causal chain between CNPC and 
Khartoum’s decision to commit genocide is needed.  Those facts 
would never come to light without a prosecution––or perhaps even 
with one.  Intent is difficult enough to prove with respect to 
individuals, let alone corporate entities.  Nevertheless, without an 
effort to thwart corporate impunity for complicity in genocide, the 
impunity will remain indefinitely. 
II 
THE CASE AGAINST CNPC 
The legal definition of genocide is met in the case of the Darfur 
tragedy in Western Sudan.66  The 1948 Genocide Convention defines 
the crime thus: 
 
Andersen, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn /content 
/article/2005 /09/05/AR2005090501333.html. 
64 STOITCHKOVA, supra note 15, at 182. 
65 Id. at 180. 
66 See Samuel Totten, The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: New 
and Disturbing Findings, 4 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 354 (2009). 
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 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.67 
Whether corporations are covered as potential defendants that can 
be charged under the Genocide Convention is an open question.  
Some scholars argue this was not intended,68 while others argue that 
it is allowed.69  Nothing in the negotiating history of the treaty points 
definitively to carving out an exception for corporations, and legal 
definitions of the term “person” used in the treaty language during 
 
67 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. II. (emphasis added). 
68 Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 286, 290 (1999). 
[The treaty] provides that “[p]ersons” committing genocide, or any of the other 
acts included in the Genocide Convention’s proscriptions, shall be punished.  
Although “persons” as a juridical concept includes natural as well as juristic 
persons, the Article expressly refers to “responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals” as examples of persons who might be punishable.  
Restrictive interpretation of this provision—the general norm of construction that 
applies to punitive provisions––and in particular application of the eiusdem 
generis-rule, would suggest that an accused under the Genocide Convention, 
ought to be confined to those who have something in common with “responsible 
rulers, public officials or private individuals:” that is, natural persons to the 
exclusion of juristic persons, including the state as a corporate body with legal 
subjectivity. 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human 
Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
565, 596 (2001). 
 International human rights law presently recognizes the implied recognition of 
correlative duties owed to facilitate the exercise of specific rights.  Yet many 
early human rights treaties were “silent as to the roles of other or alternative 
addressees in regard to promoting and protecting specific rights.”  For example, 
the Genocide Convention envisaged only the punishment of natural “persons,” 
and was silent on the responsibility of governments, corporations, media entities, 
or political parties. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
69 Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility 
Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 266 (2004). 
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that period specifically include “legal person” or corporation in the 
construction.70 
Beyond definitional considerations, the actus reus elements are not 
so difficult and can be objectively verified.  In Darfur, the janjaweed 
militia committed genocide, the Khartoum government orchestrated 
genocide, and CNPC was complicit in genocide.  Note, however, that 
these are different charges that carry differing burdens of proof––
some more problematic than others for a prosecutor to show. 
For instance, witness testimony and satellite evidence could easily 
verify the case against the janjaweed militia.  The case against the 
government would likely require seizing internal government 
documents, turning government officials into witnesses, or securing 
intercepted communications.  The case against CNPC would rest on 
internal corporate documents like meeting minutes, cross-investment 
activity, inter- and intra-corporate communications, and witnesses 
who translated CNPC-Khartoum conversations and assurances. 
In short, the more attenuated the actor from the actual genocide, the 
more difficult the case is to prove.  Thus, even though the deal 
between CNPC and Khartoum comes down to a simple quid pro quo 
(Khartoum clears the land and China drills the oil71), the evidence to 
demonstrate this will be hard to come by and compounded by the 
mens rea burden on the prosecution. 
The higher threshold for the mens rea element on charges of 
genocide requires a showing of specific intent to commit the crime.72  
CNPC would argue that its specific intent was to make money––
killing people was an antecedent by-product.  But recent case law 
allows a prosecutor to infer the requisite intent from the acts.73  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) determined in 
one case that specific intent to commit genocide can be successfully 
inferred through context.74  And on a charge of complicity, it is 
 
70 Michael J. Kelly, The Status of Corporations in the Travaux Préparatoires of the 
Genocide Convention: The Search for Personhood, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 483, 484 
(2010). 
71 Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry, WASH. POST, Dec. 
23, 2004, at A1. 
72 Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death 
at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 467, 474, 485, 506–07 (2001). 
73 KARIM A.A. KHAN & RODNEY DIXON, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 1104 (3d ed. 2009). 
74 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment ¶ 523 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
[I]t is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged 
from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically 
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enough to show that the main actor possessed the requisite intent, not 
the complicit actor.  All that must be shown for complicity is 
knowledge.75 
Consequently, if it could be demonstrated that the Sudanese 
government shared the specific intent of the janjaweed militia to 
eradicate the people of Darfur, CNPC was aware of that intent and 
knew of the genocide (it was hard to ignore given the widespread 
press accounts), and CNPC supported the government anyway, then 
CNPC could be found complicit in the genocide.76 
While the legal analysis might be straightforward, the question of 
jurisdiction presents an almost insurmountable roadblock to 
prosecuting corporations like CNPC.  On both the international and 
domestic sides of the equation, courts would face significant 
procedural difficulty asserting jurisdiction even though genocide, a 
jus cogens crime, triggers universal jurisdiction,77 theoretically 
allowing any court anywhere in the world to hear the case. 
Realistically, jurisdiction over CNPC is hard to come by.  On the 
international side, no currently constituted tribunal would have 
 
directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same 
offender or by others.  Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, 
their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of 
deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership 
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups, can enable 
the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act. 
Id. 
75 Stacy Sullivan, Has the Prosecution Made the Case?, FOREIGN POL’Y FOCUS, Oct. 2, 
2005, http://www.fpif.org/articles/has_the_prosecution_made _the_case. 
76 Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani, Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability, 6 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 783, 797 (2008) (“While it is uncontested that instigating [genocide] 
necessarily implies that the accused acted with the required intent, for aiding and abetting 
and complicity in genocide it suffices that the accomplice had knowledge of the principal’s 
(specific) intent.” (emphasis omitted)); Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling 
Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the 
United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 241, 264 (2008); see also 
KELLY, supra note 22, at 118. 
[T]he mens rea for aiding and abetting as a form of complicity in genocide would 
only be knowledge of the elements of the crime of genocide, including the 
genocidal intent of superiors or other persons, and acceptance of the course of 
events, taking into account the foreseeable consequences of providing substantial 
support. 
Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 1 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 520, 521 (2003) (quoting Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 
Decision on Rule 98 bis Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (Oct. 31, 2002)). 
77 See generally Caroline Fournet, The Universality of the Prohibition of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1948–2008, 19 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 132 (2009). 
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jurisdiction over CNPC.  The existing ad hoc criminal tribunals enjoy 
jurisdiction only over natural persons,78 as does the permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC)79––although the ICC’s Chief 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, would like to change that and 
allow for coverage of corporations.80  Their jurisdiction is statutorily 
limited.  And the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has jurisdiction 
over states only in contentious cases.81 
But the ICJ is empowered by its organic statute to issue advisory 
opinions put to it by one of sixteen approved U.N. bodies.82  This 
type of jurisdiction has been utilized three times since the turn of the 
century: in 2010 the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
requested an opinion on a judgment of the International Labor 
Organization,83 in 2008 the General Assembly requested an opinion 
on the independence of Kosovo,84 and in 2003 the General Assembly 
requested an opinion on the legality of a wall erected by Israel in the 
Palestinian territories.85 
Although seldom used, one of the U.N. bodies, even the General 
Assembly, could pose the question to the ICJ whether corporations 
are covered by the 1948 Genocide Convention.  The treaty itself, in 
Article IX, requires disputes about interpretation and application to be 
resolved by the court.86  At the very least, an opinion from the ICJ 
would put to rest the question of whether companies can commit 
genocide––just as the ICJ put to rest the question of whether states 
 
78 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5–6, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 4, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004). 
79 Rome Statute, supra note 78, at art. 6. 
80 James Podgers, Corporations in Line of Fire, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2, 2004, http://www 
.abajournal.com/magazine/article/corporations_in_line_of_fire. 
81 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 35, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
82 Id. at art. 65. 
83 Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
Organization upon a Complaint Filed Against the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, Order, (Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/146 
/15931.pdf. 
84 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org 
/docket/files/141/15987.pdf. 
85 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
86 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. IX. 
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can commit genocide in the 2007 Serbia case.87  This might add 
pressure for amending the Rome Statute of the ICC to allow for 
corporations to be prosecuted for genocide. 
On the domestic side, whether corporations can be prosecuted 
depends largely upon their amenability to the criminal jurisdiction of 
the domestic courts.  In the United States, this is possible,88 but that is 
not necessarily the case in all countries––although the trend is clearly 
in that direction.  In Canada, the necessary statutory framework is 
now in place for asserting criminal jurisdiction over corporations for 
complicity in genocide. 
Canada adopted a statute in 2000 implementing key provisions of 
the ICC’s Rome Statute.  The Canadian Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes Act89 (CAHWCA) vests jurisdiction in Canadian 
federal courts to try individuals for the crimes comprehended in the 
Rome Statute.  “Specifically, CAHWCA employs the Canadian 
definitions for both the ‘persons’ that can be tried, and for the relevant 
modes of commission to which liability will attach.  In so doing, the 
Act has created space for corporate liability for violations of 
international law that previously did not exist.”90 
Thus, for example, a domestic prosecution in Canada against 
CNPC for genocide in Sudan could potentially move forward under 
Canadian and international law if there is a demonstrable connection 
between that situation and Canada.  Mechanically, this means the 
jurisdictional provisions of CAHWCA could be employed using 
universal jurisdiction for jus cogens crimes together with Canadian 
law on aiding and abetting, which allows for criminal prosecution of 
companies (assuming CNPC would not enjoy immunity as a state-
owned enterprise). 
 The actus reus of the crime . . . will be an act that aids or abets 
the commission of a war crime, crime against humanity or genocide 
as defined by both CAHWCA and international customary law.  
Canadian courts have taken a broad understanding of what sort of 
act will constitute ‘aiding’, holding generally that any act that 
assists or helps in the commission of the offence will be sufficient. 
Abetting is similarly widely defined and includes ‘encouraging, 
instigating, promoting or procuring the crime to be committed’. 
 
87 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 
(Feb. 26). 
88 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
89 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.). 
90 Wanless, supra note 6, at 206. 
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. . . . 
 While the mens rea required to commit war crimes, crimes 
against humanity or genocide is not specifically defined by 
CAHWCA, the seriousness of the crimes demands that the mens rea 
meets constitutional standards.  As a result, mens rea will only be 
fulfilled if the accused was aware of or wilfully blind to the facts 
that would define the act as a war crime or crime against humanity 
[or genocide] . . . .  Thus, if a corporation knew or was wilfully 
blind to the fact that their actions aided or abetted the commission 
of a war crime or crime against humanity [or genocide] by a third 
party, it would have fulfilled the mens rea requirement.  Under 
Canadian law, knowledge of specific details of the crime is not 
required so long as one is aware of the type of crime to be 
committed.91 
Canada has, therefore, effectively amended the Rome Statute via 
domestic legislation to allow for the prosecution of corporate 
genocidaires in Canadian courts.  This, it seems, is the proper 
paradigm to emulate for developed states interested in holding 
companies accountable for genocidal conduct.92  At least this is the 
one currently open until jurisdiction is expanded at international 
tribunals. 
As promising as the Canadian model is, yet one final hurdle 
remains––sovereign immunity.  Even if corporations can be charged 
with genocide, and even if the knowledge threshold can be met for 
complicity, and even if jurisdiction can be asserted by a court in the 
case, CNPC could argue that it is an extension of the Chinese 
government and, as such, shares that government’s sovereign 
immunity from court jurisdiction.  And with respect to jurisdiction in 
the host state, foreign companies extract promises of immunity from 
developing countries in which they do business, shielding them from 
the courts of that state. 
A sovereign immunity barrier also exists for state-owned 
companies like CNPC with respect to civil proceedings.  Statutes like 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act93 (FSIA) in the United States 
limit the jurisdiction of domestic courts over foreign states.  American 
 
91 Id. at 207–08 (footnotes omitted). 
92 Unfortunately, and admittedly unfairly, there is a preference here for developed (or 
industrialized) states taking on domestic prosecution of companies for complicity in 
genocide as developing states are, by and large, (as a practical matter) not likely to have 
similarly well-developed common law or civil law notions of due process and evidentiary 
rigor. 
93 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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courts have interpreted the FSIA’s provisions extending sovereign 
immunity to “agenc[ies] or instrumentalities”94 of a foreign state to 
include state-owned corporations, such as CNPC, when the majority 
of the shares of the corporation are held by the government.95  
However, FSIA contains several exceptions to its jurisdiction-limiting 
rule––the most important of which is the commercial activity 
exception.  Essentially, if the foreign state or company engages in 
purely commercial activity (similar to any other private actor in the 
marketplace), then the presumption against jurisdiction could be 
rebutted.96 
Similarly, Canada’s State Immunity Act97 prevents courts from 
asserting jurisdiction over foreign states or their agencies unless the 
commercial-activity threshold is cleared.  CNPC has certainly 
engaged like any other private actor in the Sudanese petroleum 
industry, albeit aided immeasurably by the heft of the Chinese 
government and the military aid of the People’s Liberation Army.  
But to move into the realm of civil litigation98 dampens the impact of 
criminal sanctions and the stigma of a prosecutor holding a company 
criminally accountable for what it has done. 
“Criminal liability assumes an advantage over civil law and other 
less stringent mechanisms in that penal sanctions have stigmatising 
side effects.  The publicity alone of standing trial in the spotlight for 
international crimes carries unique censure.”99  If the threat of 
indictment by a court with jurisdiction is enough to cause even one 
corporation to reconsider its economic relationship with a particular 
dictator or general, then this entire effort would have been 
worthwhile.  Of course, state-owned companies like CNPC are more 
impervious to public pressure than private companies, but China may 
want to avoid such a spotlight––thereby indirectly influencing 
CNPC’s actions. 
 
94 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006). 
95 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 485 (2003). 
96 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). 
97 State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 (Can.). 
98 Other roadblocks like the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, recently interpreted as not allowing 
for litigation against foreign companies, exist along the civil lawsuit route as well.  Roger 
Alford, Second Circuit Adopts Purpose Test for ATS Corporate Liability, OPINIO JURIS, 
Oct. 2, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/02/second-circuit-adopts-purpose-test-for-ats   
-corporate-liability. 
99 STOITCHKOVA, supra note 15, at 190 (footnote omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
What justice is there for victims of genocide in Darfur if low-level 
gunmen or even government actors are tried but the companies that 
were complicit in driving the process go free?  Women like Suad 
Ahmed did nothing wrong.  But she was black, and she was living in 
the wrong place at the wrong time.  Should CNPC care what the 
Sudanese government does to these people?  Arguably it would care 
more if it faced the possibility of prosecution for complicity in 
genocide. 
Treaties now criminalize corporate participation in bribery, 
corruption, and environmental degradation.100  If companies can be 
held criminally liable for environmental pollution or bribery, then 
why not for genocide––when millions may perish?  Justice demands 
holding companies like CNPC and PetroChina accountable when they 
are complicit parties to genocide.  International legal theory provides 
the tools for doing so even if international jurisdiction is not yet 
available. 
The International Court of Justice should issue an advisory opinion 
that unequivocally holds corporations accountable when they 
participate in genocide, just as it has done for states.  Until 
international criminal tribunal jurisdiction is forthcoming, the 
Canadian model of statutory incorporation of international criminal 
law, with the prospect for prosecuting corporate actors domestically, 
is the most promising one to follow. 
The time has come for corporate impunity to stop.  The basic 
premise of corporate responsibility must be expanded.  Being a “good 
corporate citizen” in Omaha, Nebraska, means little if the company is 
doing business with other corporations backing genocide in Africa.  
For CNPC, it means more than building schools in Beijing if its 
agents are tearing them down in Sudan.  And, as we have seen with 
respect to the attention generated on behalf of victims in Darfur, the 
wired, twenty-first-century world is watching.  Companies will be 
held to account for what they do in the developing world.  The 
blinders are off and our eyes are open. 
China needs to learn this lesson now. 
 
100 Stephens, supra note 47, at 76–77. 
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APPENDIX 
ARREST WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR ON CHARGES OF 
GENOCIDE 
 
Original: English No.: ICC-02/05-01/09 Date: 12 July 2010 
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I 
Before: Judge Sylvia Steiner, Presiding Judge 
 Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng 
 Judge Cuno Tarfusser 
SITUATION IN DAFÜR, SUDAN 
IN THE CASE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR V. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR 
(“OMAR AL BASHIR”) 
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I of the International Criminal Court 
(“Chamber” and “Court” respectively); 
HAVING EXAMINED the “Prosecution’s Application under Article 
58” (“Prosecution’s Application”), filed by the Prosecution on 14 July 
2008 in the record of the situation in Darfur, Sudan (“Darfur 
situation”) requesting the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (hereinafter referred to as “Omar Al 
Bashir”) for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;101 
HAVING EXAMINED the supporting material and other 
information submitted by the Prosecution;102 
NOTING the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir” (“First 
 
101 ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp; ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Anxsl-89; Corrigendum ICC-
02/05-151-US-Exp-Corr and Corrigendum ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Corr-Anxsl & 2; and 
Public redacted version ICC-02/05-157 and ICC-02/05-157-AnxA. 
102 ICC-02/05-161 and ICC-02/05-161-Conf-AnxsA-J; ICC-02/05-179 and ICC-02/05-
179-Conf-Exp-Anxsl-5; ICC-02/05-183-US-Exp and ICC-02/05-183-Conf-Exp-AnxsA-E. 
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Decision”)103 issued on 4 March 2009, in which the Chamber 
decided: 
(i)  to issue a warrant of arrest against Omar Al Bashir for his alleged 
responsibility under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for the crimes 
against humanity and war crimes alleged by the Prosecution;104 and 
(ii) not to include the counts of genocide listed in the Prosecution’s 
Application—genocide by killing (count 1); genocide by causing 
serious bodily or mental harm (count 2); and genocide by deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s 
physical destruction (count 3)—among the crimes with respect to 
which the warrant of arrest was issued;105 
NOTING the “Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
‘Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’”  (“Appeals Decision”) dated 
3 February 2010,106 in which the Appeals Chamber reversed the First 
Decision to the extent that the Chamber “decided not to issue a 
warrant of arrest in respect of the crime of genocide in view of an 
erroneous standard of proof( . . . )”,107 and decided not to consider the 
substance of the matter108 remanding it to the Pre-Trial Chamber “for 
a new decision, using the correct standard of proof”;109 
NOTING the “Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for 
a Warrant of Arrest”,110 (“Second Decision”) in which the Chamber 
held that it was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that Omar Al Bashir was criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) 
of the Statute as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-
perpetrator, for the charges of genocide under article 6 (a), 6 (b) and 6 
(c) of the Statute, which were found in that decision to have been 
committed by the GoS forces as part of the GoS counter-insurgency 
campaign, and that his arrest appeared to be necessary under article 
58(1)(b) of the Rome Statute (“the Statute”); 
NOTING articles 19 and 58 of the Statute; 
 
103 ICC-02/05-01/09-3. 
104 ICC-02/05-01/09-3, page 92. 
105 Judge Anita Ušacka partly dissenting. 
106 ICC-02/05-01/09-73. 
107 ICC-02/05-01/09-73, page 3. 
108 ICC-02/05-01/09-73, para. 42. 
109 Ibid. 
110 ICC-02/05-01/09-94. 
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CONSIDERING that, on the basis of the material provided by the 
Prosecution in support of the Prosecution’s Application and without 
prejudice to any subsequent determination that may be made under 
article 19 of the Statute, the case against Omar Al Bashir falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Court;111 
CONSIDERING that, on the basis of the material provided by the 
Prosecution in support of the Prosecution’s Application, there is no 
ostensible cause or self-evident factor to impel the Chamber to 
exercise its discretion under article 19(1) of the Statute to determine 
at this stage the admissibility of the case against Omar Al Bashir;112 
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i) that 
soon after the attack on El Fasher airport in April 2003, the 
Government of Sudan (“GoS”) issued a general call for the 
mobilisation of the Janjaweed Militia in response to the activities of 
the SLM/A, the JEM and other armed opposition groups in Darfur, 
and thereafter conducted, through GoS forces, including the Sudanese 
Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police 
Force, the National Intelligence and Security Service (“the NISS”) 
and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (“the HAC”), a counter-
insurgency campaign throughout the Darfur region against the said 
armed opposition groups; and (ii) that the counter-insurgency 
campaign continued until the date of the filing of the Prosecution 
Application on 14 July 2008; 
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i) that 
a core component of the GoS counter-insurgency campaign was the 
unlawful attack on that part of the civilian population of Darfur - 
belonging largely to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups - perceived 
by the GoS as being close to the SLM/A, the JEM and the other 
armed groups opposing the GoS in the ongoing armed conflict in 
Darfur; and (ii) that villages and towns targeted as part of the GoS’s 
counter-insurgency campaign were selected on the basis of their 
ethnic composition and that towns and villages inhabited by other 
tribes, as well as rebel locations, were bypassed in order to attack 
towns and villages known to be inhabited by civilians belonging to 
the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups; 
 
111 As found by the Chamber in the First Decision, see ICC-02/05-01/09-3, paras. 35-
45, and reiterated in the Second Decision, para. 41. 
112 As found by the Chamber in the First Decision, see ICC-02/05-01/09-3, para. 51, 
and reiterated in the Second Decision, para. 41. 
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CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
attacks and acts of violence committed by GoS against a part of the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups took place in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the targeted 
groups as they were large in scale, systematic and followed a similar 
pattern; 
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, as 
part of the GoS’s unlawful attack on the above-mentioned part of the 
civilian population of Darfur and with knowledge of such attack, GoS 
forces subjected, throughout the Darfur region, thousands of civilians, 
belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, to acts 
of murder and extermination;113 
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe, as 
well, that as part of the GoS’s unlawful attack on the above-
mentioned part of the civilian population of Darfur and with 
knowledge of such attack, GoS forces subjected, throughout the 
Darfur region, (i) thousands of civilian women, belonging primarily 
to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, to acts of rape;114 (ii) 
civilians belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, 
to acts of torture;115 and (iii) hundreds of thousands of civilians, 
belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, to acts 
of forcible transfer;116 
 
113 Including in inter alia (i) the towns of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar and Arawala and 
surrounding villages in Wadi Salih, Mukjar and Garsila-Deleig localities in West Darfur 
between August and December 2003; (ii) the towns of Shattaya and Kailek in South 
Darfur in February and March 2004; (iii) between 89 and 92 mainly Zaghawa, Masalit and 
Misseriya Jebel towns and villages in Buram Locality in South Darfur between November 
2005 and September 2006; (iv) the town of Muhajeriya in the Yasin locality in South 
Darfur on or about 8 October 2007; (v) the towns of Saraf Jidad, Abu Suruj, Sirba, Jebel 
Moon and Silea towns in Kulbus locality in West Darfur between January and February 
2008; and (vi) Shegeg Karo and al-Ain areas in May 2008. 
114 Including in inter alia (i) the towns of Bindisi and Arawala in West Darfur between 
August and December 2003; (ii) the town of Kailek in South Darfur in February and 
March 2004; and (iii) the towns of Sirba and Silea in Kulbus locality in West Darfur 
between January and February 2008. 
115 Including in inter alia: (i) the town of Mukjar in West Darfur in August 2003; (ii) 
the town of Kailek in South Darfur in March 2004; and (iii) the town of Jebel Moon in 
Kulbus locality in West Darfur in February 2008. 
116 Including in inter alia (i) the towns of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar and Arawala and 
surrounding villages in Wadi Salih, Mukjar and Garsila-Deleig localities in West Darfur 
between August and December 2003; (ii) the towns of Shattaya and Kailek in South 
Darfur in February and March 2004; (iii) between 89 and 92 mainly Zaghawa, Masalit and 
Misseriya Jebel towns and villages in Buram Locality in South Darfur between November 
2005 and September 2006; (iv) the town of Muhajeriya in the Yasin locality in South 
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CONSIDERING that that there are also reasonable grounds to 
believe that in furtherance of the genocidal policy, as part of the 
GoS’s unlawful attack on the above-mentioned part of the civilian 
population of Darfur and with knowledge of such attack, GoS forces 
throughout the Darfur region (i) at times, contamined [sic] the wells 
and water pumps of the towns and villages primarily inhabited by 
members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups that they 
attacked;117 (ii) subjected hundreds of thousands of civilians 
belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups to acts of 
forcible transfer;118 and (iii) encouraged members of other tribes, 
which were allied with the GoS, to resettle in the villages and lands 
previously mainly inhabited by members of the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa groups;119 
CONSIDERING therefore that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that, from soon after the April 2003 attack on El Fasher 
airport at least until the date of the Prosecution’s Application, GoS 
forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied 
Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police Force, the NISS and the HAC, 
committed the crimes of genocide by killing, genocide by causing 
serious bodily or mental harm and genocide by deliberately inflicting 
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, 
within the meaning of article 6 (a), (b) and (c) respectively of the 
Statute, against part of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups; 
 
Darfur on or about 8 October 2007; and (v) the towns of Saraf Jidad, Abu Suruj, Sirba, 
Jebel Moon and Silea towns in Kulbus locality in West Darfur between January and 
February 2008. 
117 Physicians for Human Rights, Report, Darfur Assault on Survival, A call for 
Security, Justice, and Restitution (Anx J44) DAR-OTP-0119-0635 at 0679 which 
mentions three incidents of destruction of water sources. 
118 UN Security Council Press release, 22 April 2008 (Anx J38) DAR-OTP-0147-0859 
at 0860; UN Security Council 5872 meeting, 22 April 2008 (Anx J52) DAR-OTP-0147-
1057 at 1061; UNCOI Material, (Anx J72) DAR-OTP-0038-0060 at 0065; Commission of 
Inquiry into allegations surrounding human rights violations committed by armed groups 
in the States of Darfur, January 2005, Reviewed, Volume 2 (Anx 52) DAR-OTP-0116-
0568 at 0604; United Nations Inter-agency Report, 25 April 2004 (Anx J63) DAR-OTP-
0030-0066 at 0067; Third periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the human rights situation in the Sudan, April 2006 (Anx J75) DAR-
OTP-0108-0562 at 0570-0572, paras. 27, 35, 39, 44; United Nation Human Rights 
Council, Report on Human Rights Situations that require the Council’s attention 
(A/HRC/6/19) (Anx 78) at D AR-OTP-013 8-0116 at 0145- 0146; HRW Report, They 
Shot at Us as We Fled, 18 May 2008, (Anx 80) DAR-OTP-0143-0273 at 0300, 0291-0296; 
Ninth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Sudan 
(Anx J76) DAR-OTP-0136-0369 at 0372-0374. 
119 Witness statement (AnxJ47) DAR-OTP-0125-0665 at 0716, para.255. 
KELLY 1/31/2012  1:03 PM 
2011] Ending Corporate Impunity for Genocide 447 
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
Omar Al Bashir has been the de jure and de facto President of the 
Republic of the Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese 
Armed Forces from March 2003 until at least the date of the 
Prosecution’s Application 14 July 2008, and that, in that position, he 
played an essential role in coordinating, with other high-ranking 
Sudanese political and military leaders, the design and 
implementation of the above-mentioned GoS counter-insurgency 
campaign; 
CONSIDERING, further, that the Chamber finds, in the alternative, 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i) that the role of Omar 
Al Bashir went beyond coordinating the design and implementation 
of the common plan; (ii) that he was in full control of all branches of 
the “apparatus” of the Republic of the Sudan, including the Sudanese 
Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police 
Force, the NISS and the HAC; and (iii) that he used such control to 
secure the implementation of the common plan; 
CONSIDERING that, on the basis of the standard of proof as 
identified by the Appeals Chamber, there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that Omar Al Bashir acted with dolus specialis/specific intent 
to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups; 
CONSIDERING that, for the above reasons, there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that Omar Al Bashir is criminally responsible as an 
indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator, under article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute, for: 
i. Genocide by killing, within the meaning of article 6(a) of the 
Statute; 
ii. Genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, within the 
meaning of article 6(b) of the Statute; and 
iii. Genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life 
calculated to bring about physical destruction, within the 
meaning of article 6(c) of the Statute; 
CONSIDERING that, under article 58(1) of the Statute, the arrest of 
Omar Al Bashir appears necessary at this stage to ensure (i) that he 
will appear before the Court; (ii) that he will not obstruct or endanger 
the ongoing investigation into the crimes for which he is allegedly 
responsible under the Statute; and (iii) that he will not continue with 
the commission of the above-mentioned crimes; 
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FOR THESE REASONS, 
HEREBY ISSUES: 
A WARRANT OF ARREST for OMAR AL BASHIR, a male, who 
is a national of the Republic of the Sudan, born on 1 January 1944 in 
Hoshe Bannaga, Shendi Governorate, in the Sudan, member of the 
Jaáli tribe of Northern Sudan, President of the Republic of the Sudan 
since his appointment by the RCC-NS on 16 October 1993 and 
elected as such successively since 1 April 1996 and whose name is 
also spelt Omar al-Bashir, Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashire, Omar al-
Bashir, Omar al-Beshir, Omar el-Bashir, Omer Albasheer, Omar 
Elbashir and Omar Hassan Ahmad el-Béshir. 
Done in English, Arabic and French, the English being authoritative. 
Judge Sylvia Steiner 
Presiding Judge 
Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng  Judge Cuno Tarfusser 
Dated this Monday 12 July 2010 
At The Hague, The Netherlands 
No. ICC-02/05-01/09 9/9 12 July 2010 
 
